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In this paper we study asset prices in a parsimonious two-agent macroeconomic
model with two key features: limited participation in the stock market and heterogene-
ity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption. The parameter values
for the model are taken from the business cycle literature, and in particular, are not
calibrated to match ﬁnancial statistics. The model generates a number of asset pric-
ing phenomena that have been documented in the literature, including a high equity
premium and a low risk-free rate; procyclical variation in the price-dividend ratio; coun-
tercyclical variation in the equity premium, in its volatility, and in the Sharpe ratio;
and long-horizon predictability of returns with high R2 values. We also show that the
similarity of our results to those from an external habit model is not a coincidence: the
model has a reduced form representation that is similar to Campbell and Cochrane’s
(1999) framework for asset pricing. However, the implications of the two models for
macroeconomic questions and policy analyses are diﬀerent.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In the last two decades, research on asset prices has uncovered some interesting and puzzling phe-
nomena. For example, Mehra and Prescott (1985) have shown that the equity premium (the excess
return on stocks over bonds), which averages about six percent annually in the U.S., was hard to
reconcile with a canonical consumption-based asset pricing model, and as it later turned out, with
many of its extensions. Another strand of literature has found that the equity premium was pre-
dictable by a number of variables including the dividend yield, challenging the long-held view that
stock returns follow a martingale (Campbell and Shiller (1988)). Other studies have documented
that the expected equity premium, its volatility, and the ratio of the two–the conditional Sharpe
ratio–move over time following a (countercyclical) business cycle pattern (Fama and French (1989),
Schwert (1989), and Chou, Engle and Kane (1992)).1
In this paper we ask if these asset pricing phenomena can be explained in a parsimonious
macroeconomic model with two key features: limited participation in the stock market and hetero-
geneity in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in consumption (EIS). The limited nature of
stock market participation, and the concentration of stock wealth even among stockholders is well-
documented. For example, until the 1990’s more than two-thirds of U.S. households did not own
any stocks at all, while the richest one percent held 48 percent of all stocks (Poterba and Samwick
(1995), and Investment Company Institute (2002)). As for the heterogeneity in preferences, the
empirical evidence that we review in Section 3 indicates that stockholders (and the wealthy in
general) have a higher EIS than non-stockholders (and the poor in general). The interaction of
these two features is important as will become clear below.
We choose the real business cycle model as the foundation that we build upon, to provide a
contrast with the poor asset pricing implications of that framework that are well-known, which
helps to highlight the role of the new features considered in this paper. Speciﬁcally, we consider
an economy with a neoclassical production technology and competitive markets. There are two
(types of) agents. The majority of households (ﬁrst type) do not participate in the stock market
where claims to the ﬁrm’s future dividends are traded. However, a risk-free bond is available
to all households, so the non-stockholders can also accumulate wealth and smooth consumption
intertemporally. We also model the capital adjustment costs in production (as in Lucas and Prescott
(1971) among others). Finally, we assume that the stockholders have a higher EIS than the non-
stockholders. Although with CRRA utility this assumption also implies a diﬀerent risk aversion
for each group, in Section 8 we show that this heterogeneity plays no essential role for the results
of the paper. The parameters of the model are then calibrated to values from the business cycle
literature, and in particular, are not chosen to match ﬁnancial statistics.
Here is an overview of our results. First, with a relative risk aversion of 2 for both agents,
the model generates an equity premium of 3.4 percent (and 6.1 percent when the risk aversion is
4). The resulting Sharpe ratio is between 0.20 and 0.27, compared to an average of 0.32 in the
1For excellent surveys of the literature, see Kocherlakota (1996) and Campbell (1999). We discuss some of the
related work in Section 4.3.
2century-long U.S. data, and 0.42 in the post-World War II period. Second, the volatility of interest
rates is very low in the data, which has proved diﬃcult to explain for a number of asset pricing
models–a risk-free rate volatility above 15 percent is not uncommon. This volatility is 5.6 percent
in our model. Although this ﬁgure is still about twice the volatility in the data, it represents a
step in the right direction. Moreover, the dynamics of asset prices in the model are consistent
with empirical evidence: the expected equity premium, its conditional volatility, and the Sharpe
ratio are countercyclical; the price-dividend ratio is pro-cyclical and very persistent, and it predicts
future stock returns with high R2 values. The sensitivity analyses that we perform show that these
dynamics are robust to a number of extensions (such as introducing government debt, changing
the preference parameters and adjustment costs, etc.) and seem to be mainly driven by limited
participation.
These results do not rely on idiosyncratic shocks, substantial borrowing by the stockholders, or
binding borrowing constraints. Moreover, the concentration of aggregate capital income risk among
a small group of households (stockholders)–which is the mechanism most commonly associated
with limited participation–only has a modest contribution to the equity premium. Instead, most
of the equity premium arises from the interaction of three factors, which results in the concentration
of aggregate labor income risk among the stockholders. First, in response to labor income shocks
the non-stockholders have to exclusively rely on the bond market for smoothing consumption,
whereas the stockholders have the additional option of adjusting the level of capital stock. Second,
because of the heterogeneity in the EIS, the non-stockholders have a stronger desire for consumption
smoothing compared to the stockholders. The combination of these two factors implies that the
non-stockholders need the bond market much more than the stockholders. However, and third, the
bond market is not a very eﬀective device for consumption smoothing in the face of aggregate risk,
because it merely reallocates the risk rather than vanquishing it, as would be the case if shocks
were idiosyncratic. As a result, the non-stockholders’ desire for smooth consumption is satisﬁed via
trade in the bond market, at the expense of higher volatility in the stockholders’ consumption, who
then demand a large premium for holding stocks. In Section 5.1 we provide a decomposition of the
average level of the equity premium and quantify the contribution of this mechanism. We provide
a similar decomposition in Section 5.2 for the time-variation in the equity premium to identify the
source of countercyclicality in the premium.
An implication of the described mechanism is that the stockholders’ consumption growth is
considerably more volatile than that of the non-stockholders. While the existing empirical evidence
that we discuss in Section 7.1 suggests a higher volatility for the stockholders, the diﬀerence is not
as large as that implied by the model. At the same time, this empirical evidence is based on micro
data sets that contain little information on the richest one percent of U.S. households. Although
one percent may seem small, these households own half the stock market as mentioned above,
and the lack of data on this group makes a conclusive empirical statement on the stockholders’
consumption volatility diﬃcult. For now this remains a microeconomic implication of the model
that needs to be reconciled with the data.
In a recent paper Campbell and Cochrane (1999, hereafter CC) study a representative agent
3exchange economy with a slow-moving external habit term in the utility function. After choosing
the parameters of the habit process to match certain ﬁnancial moments, they ﬁnd that the model
performs impressively in other dimensions as well. There is an interesting overlap between the
results that these authors obtain and those we present in this paper. A natural question is whether
these similarities point to a deeper connection between the two frameworks. Indeed, this appears to
be the case: the limited participation model has a reduced form which is similar to Campbell and
Cochrane’s framework in terms of asset pricing implications. In particular, the exogenous process for
the habit stock in that framework corresponds to the consumption process of the non-stockholders
in our model.
A simple way to see this point is by considering the Euler equation of the stockholders. Let X
be the non-stockholders’ consumption, and CA be aggregate consumption. Then, the stockholders’
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, where we now let Xt denote the exogenous
habit stock. It is clear that the same Euler equation above holds for this representative-agent.
But now the part of aggregate consumption accounted for by the non-stockholders (Xt)–which
is necessarily omitted in a representative-agent model since there is no limited participation–
resurfaces as the habit process in the external habit model. Of course, this argument could only
be true if the properties of Xt are very similar in the two models. In Section 6 we show that the
statistical properties of the exogenous habit process assumed in CC are quite similar to those of the
consumption of the non-stockholders in the current model. In a sense, Campbell and Cochrane’s
goal was to identify the key properties that a stochastic discount factor must possess to be consistent
with asset pricing facts. This paper can be viewed as a complementary eﬀo r tt os t u d yam o d e lw h i c h
could potentially provide a microfoundation for the discount factor that these authors identiﬁed.
This interpretation also ﬁts well with the seemingly contradictory empirical ﬁndings about habit
formation from individual- and aggregate-data. Studies using aggregate data typically ﬁnd evidence
in favor of habit formation with large persistence (c.f., Ferson and Constantinides (1991)) whereas
individual-level data has so far not revealed such behavior (Naik and Moore (1996); Dynan (2000)).
Our ﬁndings suggest that even in the absence of strong habit formation at individual-level, it is
possible for an economy with limited participation and heterogeneity in the EIS to display aggregate
behavior which gives the appearance of external habit formation.
The similarities between the asset pricing implications of the two models should be interpreted
with care. For example, this close correspondence does not extend to the macroeconomic behaviors
of these models. In a separate paper (Guvenen (2003)) we study the implications of the limited
participation model (without adjustment costs) for aggregate quantities and cross-sectional distri-
4butions and ﬁnd that it performs as well as the standard RBC model along several dimensions
while improving upon it in certain directions. On the other hand, Lettau and Uhlig (2000) embed
the habit speciﬁcation employed by CC in an RBC model and ﬁnd it diﬃcult to be reconciled
with certain macroeconomic facts. After considering a number of extensions, they conclude that
“introducing habit formation in consumption and leisure yields counterfactual cyclical behavior in
an otherwise standard real business cycle model.”
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the parametrization is
discussed in Section 3. We then present the main asset pricing results, and discuss related work
in Section 4. Section 5 examines the working of the model, and Section 6 analyzes the connec-
tion between this model and the external habit model. Section 7 discusses some microeconomic
implications, and Section 8 presents extensions and sensitivity analyses. Section 9 concludes.
2 The Model
The model is an extension of the framework studied in Guvenen (2003). Our modeling goal is to
stay as close to the standard real business cycle model as possible and only introduce two key fea-
tures: limited participation in the stock market and heterogeneity in the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution.
The Firm
There is an aggregate ﬁrm producing a single consumption good using capital (Kt) and labor
(Lt) inputs according to a Cobb-Douglas technology, Yt = ZtKθ
t L1−θ
t , where θ ∈ (0,1) is the factor
share parameter. The logarithm of the stochastic technology level evolves as an AR(1) process:
























subject to the technology constraint which features adjustment costs in investment:







t is the ex-dividend value of the ﬁrm, and βj (Λt+j/Λt) i st h ed i s c o u n tr a t e( i . e . ,t h e
marginal rate of substitution between periods t and t + j). The function Φ(·) is assumed to be
concave in investment, which captures the diﬃculty of quickly changing the level of capital installed
in the ﬁrm. As a result of these adjustment costs, the price of installed capital is not necessarily
equal to the price of the consumption good.
The ﬁrm is 100 percent equity ﬁnanced as commonly assumed in the real business cycle litera-
5ture. Abstracting from leverage allows us to focus exclusively on the eﬀects of limited participation
and preference heterogeneity. A share in this ﬁrm entitles its owner to the entire stream of future
dividends given by Dt = ZtKθ
t L1−θ
t − WtLt − It. The ﬁrm does not issue new shares and ﬁnances
investment through retained earnings. For convenience we normalize the number of shares out-
standing to unity so that Ps
t is also the stock price. Finally, competitive labor markets ensure that
workers are paid their marginal product: Wt =( 1− θ)Zt (Kt/Lt)
θ .
Households
The economy is populated by two types of agents who live forever. The population is constant,
and is normalized to unity. Let µ ∈ (0,1) denote the measure of the second type of agents (who will
be called “stockholders” later). Both agents have time separable expected utility functions deﬁned




, for i = h, n, where the superscripts h
and n denote stockholders and non-stockholders respectively. Regarding the parameterization of
the momentary utility function, we have two considerations in mind. On the one hand, we want
to keep preferences simple to highlight the eﬀect of limited participation and other endogenous





and we adopt it through most of the paper. On the other hand, it is well-known that with this
speciﬁcation the parameter αi controls both the relative risk aversion (RRA) and the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS) which are diﬀerent aspects of individuals’ tastes. In Section 8 we
disentangle these two parameters using the recursive utility function of Epstein and Zin (1989), to
illustrate the diﬀerent roles played each parameter in the model.
Both agents have one unit of time endowment in each period, which they supply inelastically to
the ﬁrm. Besides the stock of the ﬁrm, there is also a one-period riskless household bond (in zero
net supply)2 traded in this economy. The diﬀerence between the two groups is in their investment
opportunity sets: the “non-stockholders” can freely trade the risk-free asset, but they are restricted
from participating in the capital market. The “stockholders,” on the other hand, have access to
both markets and hence are the sole capital owners in the economy. Following the incomplete
markets literature we impose portfolio constraints as a convenient way to prevent Ponzi schemes.
Remark.–It is possible to think of the participation structure assumed here as an endogenous
outcome of a model where there is a one-time ﬁxed cost of entering the stock market. With a cost
of appropriate magnitude, the group of agents with low risk aversion will enter the stock market
whereas the other group will stay out. The resulting equilibrium is identical to the one studied
here; see Guvenen (2003) for further discussion. In Section 7.2 we quantify the magnitude of this
participation cost in our model.
Individuals’ Dynamic Problem and the Equilibrium
We study the recursive equilibrium of this economy in which the portfolio holdings of each group
together with the exogenous technology shock constitute a suﬃcient state vector summarizing the
relevant information for agents. In a given period, the portfolio of each group can be expressed in
2We allow for a positive supply of bonds in Section 8.
6terms of the beginning-of-period capital stock, K, the aggregate bond holdings of non-stockholders
after production, B, and the technology level, Z. Let Υ denote the aggregate state vector (K,B,Z).
The dynamic programming problem of a stockholder can be expressed as follows:










C + PB (Υ)b0 + Ps (Υ)s0 ≤ ω + W (K,Z)






K0 = ΓK (Υ)




where ω denotes ﬁnancial wealth; b0 and s0 are individual bond and stock holdings respectively;
the endogenous functions ΓK and ΓB denote the laws of motion for the wealth distribution which
are determined in equilibrium; and PB is the equilibrium bond pricing function. Note that each
type of agent is facing a constraint on bond holdings with possibly diﬀerent (and negative) lower
bounds. The problem of a non-stockholder can be written as above with s0 ≡ 0, and the superscript
h replaced with n.
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium for this economy is given by a pair of value func-
tions V i ¡
ωi;Υ
¢






; a stockholding decision rule for the stockholder, s0 ¡
ωh;Υ
¢
; stock and bond pricing
functions, Ps (Υ) and PB (Υ); a competitive wage function, W (K,Z); an investment function
for the ﬁrm, I (Υ);laws of motion for aggregate capital and the aggregate bond holdings of non-
stockholders, ΓK (Υ), ΓB (Υ);and a marginal utility process Λ(Υ), such that:
1) Given the pricing functions and the laws of motion, the value function and decision rules of
each agent solve that agent’s dynamic problem.
2) Given W (K,Z) and the equilibrium discount rate process obtained from Λ(Υ), the invest-
ment function I (Υ) and the labor choice of the ﬁrm are optimal.
3) Asset markets clear: µbh0 ¡
 h;Υ
¢
+( 1− µ)bn0 ( n;Υ)=0 ;and µs0 ¡
 h;Υ
¢
=1 , where  i
denotes the wealth of each type of agent in state Υ in equilibrium; and the labor market clears:
L = µ × 1+( 1− µ) × 1=1 .
4) Aggregates result from individual behavior:






5) There exists an invariant probability measure P deﬁned over the ergodic set of equilibrium
distributions.
7Table 1: Baseline Parameterization
Quarterly Model
Parameter Value
β Time discount rate 0.99
1/αh EIS of stockholders 0.5
1/αn EIS of non-stockholders 0.1
µ Participation rate 0.2
ρz Persistence of aggregate shock 0.95
σε Standard deviation of shock 0.02
θ Capital share 0.3
ξ Adjustment cost coeﬃcient 0.23
δ Depreciation rate 0.02
Bh Borrowing limit of stockholders 16W
Bn Borrowing limit non-stockholders 8W
Notes: The baseline model assumes CRRA utility functions for both agents implying that the relative risk
aversion parameter is 2 for the stockholders and 10 for the non-stockholders. Borrowing limits are indexed to
the average wage rate, W.
3 Quantitative Analysis
We use numerical methods to solve for the equilibrium since an analytical solution is not available.
The details of the computational algorithm as well as the accuracy of the solution and related issues
are discussed in a computational appendix available from the author’s website.
Baseline Parameterization
A common method for calibrating general equilibrium asset pricing models is to choose a number
of parameters to match certain ﬁnancial statistics, such as the risk-free rate, the equity premium,
the persistence of the price-dividend ratio, and so on. Then additional moments of the data serve as
overidentifying restrictions to be examined. Instead, here we follow the real business cycle tradition
and calibrate the parameters to replicate the long-run macroeconomic facts of the U.S. economy
such as the average capital-output ratio, the persistence of the Solow residuals and so on.
Table 1 summarizes our baseline parameterization. The time period in the model corresponds to
3 months of calendar time. The capital share of output (θ) is set equal to 0.3, and the depreciation
rate (δ) is set to 0.02. As for the technology shock, we match the persistence of the quarterly Solow
residual, ρz =0 .95, and set the standard deviation of the innovation to 2 percent. Although this
latter number is larger than the one reported in Cooley and Prescott (1995) for the post-war period,
it is consistent with the estimates obtained by Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), and the values
used in Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2001), Danthine and Donaldson (2002) among others. In
addition, we will compare the asset prices generated by the model to the U.S. data extending back
to 1890. Since output and consumption were more volatile prior to World War II, a higher volatility
for the Solow residual seems consistent with this focus. We discretize the AR(1) process for Zt using
a 12-state Markov process following Tauchen and Hussey’s (1991) method as described in Aiyagari
8(1994). The approximation is fairly accurate, with an autocorrelation structure (from lag 1 to 5)
w h i c ht r a c k st h a to ft h eA R ( 1 )p r o c e s sc l o s e l y ,a nd a standard deviation nearly equal to the true
value (details are provided in the appendix).3
Following Jermann (1998), the functional form for Φ is speciﬁed as a1 (It/Kt)
1−1/ξ +a2,w h e r e
a1 and a2 are constants chosen such that the steady state level of capital is invariant to ξ. The
curvature parameter ξ determines the severity of adjustment costs. As ξ approaches inﬁnity, Φ
becomes linear, and investment is converted into capital one for one (frictionless economy limit).
At the other extreme, as ξ approaches zero, Φ becomes a constant function, and the capital stock
remains constant regardless of the investment level (exchange economy limit). We set ξ =0 .23,
as in Jermann (1998) and Boldrin et al. (1999).4 This value is near the low end of the empirical
estimates for this parameter (i.e., the elasticity of investment with respect to Tobin’s q), so in
Section 8 we also conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to it.
Participation Rates.–Our model assumes a constant participation rate in the stock market,
which seems to be a reasonable approximation for the period before the 1990’s when the partici-
pation rate was either stable or increasing gradually (Poterba and Samwick (1995, Table 7)). In
contrast, during the 1990’s participation has increased substantially: from 1989 to 2002 the number
of households who owned stocks increased by 74 percent, and by 2002 half of the U.S. households
had become stock owners (Investment Company Institute (2002)). Modeling the participation boom
in this latter period would require going beyond the stationary structure of our model, so we leave
it for future work. In this paper, we exclude this later period (1992−) both when calibrating the
participation rate and when comparing the model to the data. We set the participation rate in the
model, µ, to 20 percent, roughly corresponding to the average rate from 1962 to 1992 (a period
during which participation data is available). Note that even during times when participation was
higher, households in the top 20 percent have consistently owned more than 98 percent of all stocks
(Poterba and Samwick (1995, Table 9)).
Borrowing constraints do not play an important economic role in our model (other than pre-
venting Ponzi schemes). However, they are important for computational reasons: the bounds of
the grid for B are determined by these constraints, so relaxing them expands the state space over
which we need to solve for all the equilibrium functions. Thus, we choose these constraints to be as
loose as possible subject to the condition that the model can still be solved without compromising
accuracy. The resulting lower bounds are Bh =1 6× E (W),a n dBn =8× E (W), which rarely
bind in our simulation of the baseline model.5
Preference Parameters.–The subjective discount factor, β, is set equal to 0.99 in order to match
the U.S. capital-output ratio of 2.5. We calibrate the curvature parameter α mainly based on the
implied elasticity of intertemporal substitution. There is a large body of empirical work document-
3This appendix (which also contains sensitivity analyses) is made available on the author’s website to save space
here. Any reference in text to the appendix refers to this online document.
4Jermann (1998) chose ξ to improve his model’s ability to match some ﬁnancial moments although he also provided
empirical evidence to support this choice. In this sense, there is a partial caveat to the statement above that we do
not calibrate any parameter based on ﬁnancial variables.
5Tightening the constraints to B
h =1 2× E (W),a n dB
n =2× E (W), had a negligible eﬀect on the results.
9ing heterogeneity in the EIS across the population (see for example, Blundell, Browning and Meghir
(1994), Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). See Guvenen (2003,
section 2.1) for a more complete review of the empirical evidence.) In particular, these studies ﬁnd
that stockholders (and the wealthy in general) have a signiﬁcantly higher elasticity of substitution
than non-stockholders (and the poor in general). While it is not straightforward to aggregate the
parameter estimates obtained in these diﬀerent studies, it is reasonable to say that the estimates
of stockholders’ EIS are generally closer to unity, and those of non-stockholders are closer to zero.
In our baseline speciﬁcation, we set EISn =1 /αn =0 .1, but choose stockholders’ elasticity to be
somewhat lower than some empirical estimates: EISh =1 /αh =0 .5, so that the resulting risk
aversion for this group is not very low. Notice also that with CRRA utility heterogeneity in the
EIS implies heterogeneity in risk aversion. Interestingly, this heterogeneity plays no essential role
in our results as we show in Section 8.
4M o d e l R e s u l t s
4.1 The Unconditional Moments of Asset Prices
In this section we study the asset pricing implications of the baseline model. We begin by discussing
the unconditional moments of stock and bond returns. Table 2 displays the statistics from the sim-
ulated model along with their empirical counterparts computed from the historical U.S. data taken
from Campbell (1999). The stock return and the risk-free rate are calculated from Standard and
Poor’s 500 index and the 6-month commercial paper rate (bought in January and rolled over in
July) respectively. All returns are real (except where indicated) and are obtained by deﬂating nom-
inal returns with the consumption deﬂator series from the same data set. We draw two sub-samples
for empirical analysis: The “long sample” corresponds to the period 1890−1991,a n dt h e“ p o s t - w a r
sample” covers 1947−1991. The long sample has the advantage of providing more observations and
consequently more precise estimates of the relevant statistics (especially since some of the variables
we study–such as the price-dividend ratio–are very persistent). Moreover, this period includes
the Great Depression years. Since one cannot rule out the repeat of such historical episodes, in-
cluding this period into the sample is important for an accurate characterization of the average
properties of asset prices. On the other hand, asset markets have changed signiﬁcantly over the
last century, suggesting that a focus on more recent data could be more relevant for understanding
asset markets today. With these considerations in mind, we present empirical statistics from both
sub-samples and discuss how our simulations compare to data from each period.
The Mean and Volatility of the Equity Premium.–In the long sample, the equity premium is
6.2 percent with a standard deviation of 19.4 percent yielding a Sharpe ratio of 0.32.T h ep o s t - w a r
sample provides a harder target with a higher equity premium of 7.2 percent and a lower volatility
of 17.0 percent implying a larger Sharpe ratio of 0.42. One explanation for the higher premium
in the latter period was suggested by McGrattan and Prescott (2001), who argued that about 1.8
percentage points of the annual return on equity was attributable to favorable changes in the tax
10Table 2: The First Two Moments of Asset Returns
US Data Baseline Model RBC
Long Sample Post-War αh =2 αh =4
Panel A: The Equity Premium and the Risk-free Rate
E(Rs − Rf)6 .17 7.21 3.43 6.11 .004
σ(Rs − Rf)1 9 .41 7 .01 7 .22 2 .40 .27
E(Rs−Rf)
σ(Rs−Rf) 0.32 0.42 0.20 0.27 .014
E(Rf)1 .91 1.33 1.98 0.61 4.16
σ(Rf)5 .44 2.70 5.62 7.31 0.18
ρ(Rs,R f) −0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.97
Panel B: The Price-Dividend Ratio
E(Ps/D)2 2 .12 4 .72 5 .72 9 .4 —
σ(log(Ps/D)) 26.32 7 .22 0 .13 0 .5 —
Notes: The mean and standard deviation of variables are reported in annualized percentages. The data is
from Campbell (1999) and covers 1890−1991. The equity return and the risk-free rate are calculated from the
Standard and Poor’s 500 index and the commercial paper rate respectively. The RBC model has a single agent
with stockholders’ preferences, and the same parameterization as the baseline, except that ξ=∞.
code–speciﬁcally to the reduction of dividend and corporate income taxes–from 1960 onward.
Using this adjustment from 1960 to 1991 would reduce the equity premium in the post-war sample
to 5.9 percent.
The baseline model generates an equity premium of 3.4 percent, which is about half the historical
value. One way to increase this number further is by assuming a higher risk aversion for the
stockholders: with αh =4 , the equity premium rises to 6.1 percent nearly matching the average
value in the long sample. The standard deviation of excess returns is 17.2 percent in the baseline
case, which is reasonably close to its empirical counterparts (19.4 and 17.0 p e r c e n ti ne a c hp e r i o d
respectively), but increasing the risk aversion to 4 raises the standard deviation to 22.4 percent,
making it somewhat too volatile.
The Sharpe ratio is 0.20 in the baseline model and rises to 0.27 when the risk aversion is 4.T h e
price of risk can be increased further by choosing a larger αh, and the resulting excessive volatility
can be reduced by relaxing the adjustment costs (higher ξ) as we show in Section 8. However, even
ac u r v a t u r eo f4 implies an EIS of 0.25 for the stockholders, which is arguably too low in light of
the empirical work mentioned in Section 3. Thus, it seems preferable to keep αh at its relatively
low baseline value of 2, and attribute the diﬀerence between the Sharpe ratio in the data and the
one implied by the model to factors not present in our model (such as idiosyncratic shocks, etc.).
Finally, the correlation of stock returns and interest rates is close to zero in the U.S. data as well
as in our simulations.
The Mean and Volatility of the Risk-Free Rate.–The average risk-free rate is 2.0 percent in
the baseline model, similar to the 1.9 percent in the long sample, and slightly higher than the 1.3
percent in the post-war period. Increasing the risk aversion to 4 increases the equity premium and
pushes the interest rate down to 0.6 percent.
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A well-documented feature of the interest rate–and as it turns out, a challenging one to
explain–is its low volatility. The standard deviation of the real rate is 5.4 percent in the long
sample, but even lower, 2.7 percent, in the post-war period. Part of this variability is due to un-
expected inﬂation, so one can alternatively look at the volatility of the nominal rate, which is 2.9
percent and 3.3 percent in the long and post-war samples respectively.
In our baseline model, the standard deviation of the risk-free rate is 5.6 percent. Although this
number is close to its counterpart in the long sample, it is about double the volatility in the post-war
period, and equally high compared to the variability of the nominal rate. However, models that
match the equity premium often have diﬃculty generating even moderately smooth interest rates.
For example, in Boldrin et al. (1999) the variability ranges from 17.4 to 25.4 percent depending on
the speciﬁcation. The volatility is somewhat lower in Jermann (1998), around 12 percent, partly
because he assumes a higher risk aversion. Thus, while the interest rate is still too volatile in our
model compared to data, it provides a step in the right direction. So, what explains the relatively
low variability of interest rates in this model?
To understand the mechanism, consider the bond market diagram in Figure 1. The left panel
depicts the case of a representative agent with a low EIS, which is a feature common to the models
mentioned above. For example, both the endogenous and the external habit models imply a low
EIS (despite diﬀering in the risk aversion implications). In this framework, the interaction of
the inelastic (steep) bond demand curve with a bond supply that is perfectly inelastic at zero
(because of the representative-agent assumption) means that even small shocks to the demand
curve will generate large movements in the bond price, and consequently, in the risk-free rate. On
the other hand, in the limited participation model the mechanism is diﬀerent. First, notice that the
majority–eighty percent–of the population (the non-stockholders) have a very low EIS as before,
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denote the negative of the stockholders’ bond demand as “bond supply”) the key diﬀerence here
is that it is not inelastic at all. In fact, the stockholders’ supply curve is rather ﬂat both because
of their high intertemporal elasticity (EIS =0 .5) and also because they have another asset to
substitute for bond. As a result, a shock to the demand curve of similar magnitude as before now
results in smaller ﬂuctuations in the interest rate and the rest is reﬂected in the variability of trade
volume.
The described mechanism also shows how the interest rate volatility can be reduced further.
Notice from the diagram that, in addition to the shifts in the bond demand curve, interest rate
volatility will also be aﬀected by the shifts in the bond supply curve in response to aggregate shocks.
One way to make the supply curve more stable is then to relax the adjustment costs faced by the
ﬁrm. In this case, the level of capital can be adjusted more easily in response to shocks, allowing
the stockholders to smooth their consumption without relying on the bond market. As a result the
bond supply curve will move less over the business cycle, reducing the interest rate volatility. For
example, setting ξ =0 .5, reduces the volatility to 4.2 percent, and setting ξ =0 .8 reduces it further
to 3.4 percent. Relaxing adjustment costs also lowers the volatility of stock returns but has little
impact on the dynamics of asset prices as we discuss in Section 8.
The Price-Dividend Ratio.–The average price-dividend ratio in the baseline model is around
25.7 and compares well with the post-war value of 24.7; but it is somewhat higher than the average
of 22.1 in the longer sample. The volatility seems a little low, 20.1 percent compared to about 27
percent in the data. Increasing the risk aversion to 4, raises both the mean (29.4) and the volatility
(30.4 percent) above their empirical counterparts.
4.2 The Dynamics of Asset Prices
Counter-cyclical variation in conditional moments
T h e r ei sal a r g el i t e r a t u r ei nﬁnance on the dynamics of asset prices. These studies document
that the price-dividend ratio is pro-cyclical, and exhibits co-movement with macroeconomic condi-
tions not only at business cycle frequencies but also at longer horizons (Fama and French (1989)).
Second, the expected equity premium and its conditional volatility both exhibit countercyclical
variation over time (see Campbell and Shiller (1988), and Schwert (1989) among others). More-
over, expected excess returns move more than conditional volatility, so the ratio of the two–the
conditional Sharpe ratio–is also countercyclical (Chou, Engle and Kane (1992)).
Table 3 displays the cyclical variation in the moments of asset prices.6 First, the log price-
dividend ratio is strongly pro-cyclical in the baseline model (corr :0 .90). This is because when a
(persistent) technology shock hits the economy, the stock price capitalizes all the future productivity
gains upon impact and thus increases substantially, while the initial response of dividends is muted
due to higher investment levels after the shock, making the ratio of the two variables pro-cyclical.
6The results presented in the rest of the paper pertain to the baseline model with α
h =2 . However, the results
are very similar when α
h =4 , except for the few cases that we explicitly mention in the text.
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Notes: The trend of annual output is removed using a linear trend. Using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter with a
smoothing parameter of 100 increases the reported correlations slightly. The last three rows of columns 1 and
2 do not provide point estimates since a direct empirical measure of conditional moments is not available to
calculate the correlations. The statistics from the model are also calculated from annualized returns.
Although the price-dividend ratio is also pro-cyclical in the U.S. data, the raw correlation with
output is much weaker than in our model (corr :0 .15 and 0.42 in the long- and post-war samples
respectively).
We next discuss the conditional moments of returns (rows 3 to 5). First, the model generates
an expected equity premium and conditional volatility that are both countercyclical as in the data.
Second, the movements in expected returns are large: the coeﬃcient of variation is 0.35, and the 95
percent conﬁdence interval extends from 0.6 percent to 4.7 percent in the baseline case (and from
1.5 percent to 7.9 percent when αh =4 ) . The conditional volatility also exhibits signiﬁcant time
variation: the coeﬃcient of variation is 0.19 and the 95 percent conﬁdence interval extends from 8.4
percent to 19.5 percent (and from 11.2 percent to 24.7 percent when αh =4 ) . The Sharpe ratio is
also countercyclical (corr : −0.53), as could be anticipated from the fact that expected returns are
more variable than conditional volatility. Finally, despite the countercyclical variation in expected
returns, the realized equity premium is procyclical in the data, which is also the case in the model
(corr :0 .28).
Predictability of Returns: Long Horizon Regressions
We ﬁrst regress log stock returns on the log price-dividend ratio using the U.S. data (Table
4). The well-known pattern documented in the literature can been seen here: the coeﬃcients are
negative indicating that a high price-dividend ratio forecasts lower returns in the future. Moreover
both the coeﬃcients and the R2 values are increasing with horizon and reach signiﬁcant levels.
The model counterpart is reported in the last three columns. The coeﬃcient estimates and the
R2 values are similar to empirical results: predictability is modest at one year horizon but increases
steadily and reaches 50 percent at 10 year horizon. The coeﬃcients also increase quickly ﬁrst and
then grow more slowly. Furthermore, in the empirical regression lagged dividend growth has almost
no predictive power when included as an additional regressor (columns 3 and 6), which is also true
in simulated data (column 9): the R2 values remain virtually unchanged and the coeﬃcients (not
reported) are small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
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∆d included? No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Horizon (k) Slope R2 R2 Slope R2 R2 Slope R2 R2
1 −0.08 .06 .06 −0.10 .11 .11 −0.13 .12 .12
3 −0.16 .12 .13 −0.18 .31 .32 −0.30 .27 .27
5 −0.25 .21 .22 −0.33 .51 .51 −0.42 .38 .38
7 −0.34 .27 .28 −0.44 .57 .58 −0.49 .44 .44
10 −0.36 .39 .39 −0.64 .73 .73 −0.57 .51 .51
Notes: The coeﬃcients for the regression when ∆d is included are very similar to those with dividends left out
and hence are not reported. r
s
t,t+k is obtained by aggregating the log stock return over k years; k denotes the
h o r i z o ni ny e a r s .
Table 5: Variance of Price-Dividend Ratio Explained by Future Covariances
Variance U.S. Data Model
explained by Long Sample Post-War
−rs
t+j 101 137 134
∆dt+j −10 −31 −28




jcov(pt − dt,x t+j))/var(pt − dt) where x is ∆d and −r
s in each case). The formula is calculated
using 15 lags (years) both in the data and in the model.
An alternative manifestation of return predictability is the excess volatility of stock prices. A
simple way to see this is by ﬁrst decomposing the variance of the log price-dividend ratio following
Cochrane (1992). Deﬁning γ ≡ (P
s/D)/(1 + (P
s/D))at the steady state values of Ps and D,w e
have:
var(pt − dt) ≈
∞ X
j=1









t is the log stock return. Both in the U.S. data and in the model (Table 5) a substantial
fraction of total volatility is accounted for by the covariance of the log price-dividend ratio with
future returns and only a small component is explained by varying expectations of future dividend
growth. Moreover, both autocovariances are negative, consistent with the idea that a high Ps/D
ratio signals low dividend growth which in turn means low returns in the future.
Autocorrelations and Cross-correlations of Returns
The autocorrelation structures of ﬁnancial variables display a variety of patterns. For example,
the price-dividend ratio is extremely persistent; the risk-free rate is persistent whereas the equity
premium has no signiﬁcant persistence and displays mild mean reversion. At the same time, the
absolute value of the risky rate displays positive autocorrelation both at short- and long-horizons




A. p − d
Long sample .79 .59 .52 .35 .32
Post-war .85 .69 .60 .23 .03
Model .79 .65 .56 .41 .31
B. rs−rf
Long sample .03 −.22 .08 −.14 .10
Post-war −.08 −.24 .19 .05 .05










Long sample .03 −.19 −.11 −.29 −.15
Post-war −.08 −.31 −.12 −.07 −.02
Model −.04 −.08 −.12 −.16 −.18
D. rf
Long sample (R∗) .53 .36 .23 .14 .15
Post-war .52 .24 .36 .07 −.05
Long sample (N∗) .83 .73 .69 .60 .57
Post-war .84 .66 .59 .47 .43
Model .85 .68 .56 .37 .26
E. |rs|
Long sample .13 .09 .06 .14 .15
Post war .03 −.28 .06 −.10 −.16
Model .06 .05 .03 .03 .03
Notes: The rows denoted by R
∗ and N
∗ report the correlation for real and nominal interest rates respectively.
Statistics from the model are calculated from annualized values of each variable, but the stock price is taken to
be the value at the end of the year.
indicating clustering of volatility. It is of interest to see what aspects of these autocorrelation
structures are captured by the model.
First, the price-dividend ratio is highly persistent in the model, with an annual ﬁrst order
autocorrelation of 0.79. Higher order autocorrelations decay slowly, and track their empirical
counterparts in the long sample quite well (Table 6). The persistence is slightly higher in the
post-war sample up to the fourth lag, but then falls oﬀ abruptly.
Second, the autocorrelations of the equity premium are small and negative in the model, indicat-
ing weak mean reversion. Although the general pattern in the data indicates weak mean reversion,
the autocorrelations are not uniformly negative. However, because these autocorrelations are close
to zero, they are not precisely measured given the modest number of annual observations, so an
alternative statistic used in the literature aggregates consecutive autocorrelation coeﬃcients. The
sum of these autocorrelations (panel C) shows a stronger pattern of mean reversion in the data,
and the simulated data is consistent with the signs and rough magnitudes of these statistics.
16Third, the interest rate is highly persistent in the model, with a ﬁrst order autocorrelation of
0.84, and higher order terms that decay faster than an AR(1) process. Measuring the empirical
counterpart is somewhat tricky because in reality bonds are only nominally risk-free due to unan-
ticipated inﬂation. Using the ex-post real rate is one possible approach (R∗ in panel D) but the
autocorrelation structure calculated this way is downward biased because of unanticipated inﬂation.
An alternative option is to use the nominal rate which might be a better indicator of the risk-free
rate investors anticipate (N∗ in panel D). This series is signiﬁcantly more persistent, with slowly
decaying autocorrelations. The model counterpart is closer to the empirical values at the ﬁrst three
lags, but then falls faster than in the data at longer horizons.
Fourth, a well-documented ﬁnding is the persistence of stock return volatility: high volatility is
typically followed by more volatility. In the long sample, absolute returns are positively autocorre-
lated even at long horizons consistent with persistent volatility. On the other hand, the post-war
sample reveals some rather large negative autocorrelations. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) also
note these negative values and suggest that it may be due to sampling error in a small sample.
The model generates absolute returns that are positively correlated at short and long horizons. In
addition, one can compute the conditional volatility of stock returns (σt(rs
t+1))e x p l i c i t l yi nt h e
model, which also reveals persistent volatility: its ﬁrst order autocorrelation is 0.84, and decays
slowly; the tenth order autocorrelation is still above 0.30.
4.3 Relation to the Literature
There is a vast literature on the asset pricing puzzles addressed in this paper, and it is not possible
to do justice to all the work in the ﬁeld in this limited space. For detailed surveys of the literature
see Kocherlakota (1996) and Campbell (1999). This paper is more closely related to the strand
of literature which emphasizes the role of limited participation starting with Mankiw and Zeldes
(1991). Saito (1995), and Basak and Cuoco (1998) study general equilibrium models with limited
participation in the stock market. To our knowledge, Saito (1995) is the ﬁrst to draw attention to
a possible link between limited participation andh a b i tp e r s i s t e n c eb a s e do ne q u a t i o n( 1 ) ,t h o u g h
he did not pursue that relation further in his paper. Also, that link is not as strong in his model
due to the absence of preference heterogeneity and labor income risk which play essential roles in
generating our results. In a recent paper, Guo (2002) studies an exchange economy model with
limited participation which generates a number of asset pricing facts. Those results however also
rely on large income shocks to each group (36 percent per year) in addition to aggregate shocks, as
well as frequently binding borrowing constraints. In an interesting paper, Danthine and Donaldson
(2002) study asset prices in a two-agent macro model with an entrepreneur and a worker (where the
worker lives hand-to-mouth) and emphasize the role of the operational leverage introduced by labor
contracts. Finally, taking slightly diﬀerent econometric approaches, Attanasio et al. (2002) and
Brav et al. (2002) ﬁnd that Euler equations are less likely to be rejected when only stockholders’
consumption is used instead of aggregate consumption. Our paper complements this work by
presenting a model that generates the consumption process of stockholders as a general equilibrium
17outcome, which in turn generates the asset pricing phenomena examined.
5 Understanding the Sources of Equity Premium
The large and countercyclical equity premium arises from the interaction of (i) limited participation;
(ii) preference heterogeneity; and (iii) precautionary savings in response to persistent (aggregate)
labor income shocks. The last two components are typically absent from standard models of limited
participation (Saito (1995), Basak and Cuoco (1998), and Guo (2002)) and are essential for the
results of this paper. In the next subsection we discuss the mechanism generating a high average
price of risk. Then, in Section 5.2 we address why the price of risk varies (countercyclically) over
time.
5.1 The Average Level of Equity Premium
An intuitive explanation of the basic mechanism for the average price of risk is as follows. First,
limited participation ampliﬁes the eﬀects of aggregate risk by concentrating capital income among
a small fraction of the population. This eﬀect does not depend on (ii) or (iii). Nevertheless, as
we shall see, this channel only has a modest contribution to the equity premium for plausible
parameterizations of the model.
The second and major eﬀect of limited participation works through the bond market, and is
a combination of three factors, which reinforce each other. First, limited participation creates an
asymmetry in consumption smoothing opportunities: facing persistent (aggregate) labor income
shocks, the non-stockholders have to exclusively rely on the bond market whereas the stockholders
have the additional option of adjusting their stock holdings in response to shocks. Second, because
of the heterogeneity in the EIS, the non-stockholders have a much stronger desire for a smooth
consumption process compared to the stockholders who tolerate ﬂuctuations better. The combina-
tion of these two eﬀects imply that the non-stockholders need the bond market much more than
the stockholders, which is reﬂected in the diﬀerent bond demand elasticities in Figure 1. However,
and third, the bond market is not a very eﬀective device for consumption smoothing in the face of
aggregate risk, because it merely shifts the risk around rather than reducing it, as would be the case
if shocks were idiosyncratic.7 In equilibrium, the non-stockholders’ desire for smooth consumption
is satisﬁed via trade in the bond market, at the expense of higher volatility in the stockholders’
consumption. Moreover, since these large ﬂuctuations in the stockholders’ consumption are pro-
cyclical, they are reluctant to own the shares of the aggregate ﬁrm that performs well in booms
and poorly in recessions. As a result, they demand a high equity premium. In the rest of this
7This distinction is important: in models with idiosyncratic shocks (c.f., Heaton and Lucas (1996)), the two-agent
assumption implies that idiosyncratic shocks are perfectly negatively correlated and thus can be virtually eliminated
by trading in the bond market. In this case, trade in the bond market can reduce both agents’ consumption volatility.
In contrast, here income risk arises from aggregate shocks, and the bond market merely reallocates this aggregate risk
to the agent who is more willing to bear it. As a result, smoothing one agent’s consumption comes at the expense of
extra volatility in the other agent’s consumption.
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Stockholders 0.214 0.293 0.495
Non-stockholders 3.30 0.68 −2.99
Note: i=h,n. See the text for the deﬁnitions of ai and Ai.
subsection, we quantify the eﬀect of this mechanism on the equity premium.
It is instructive to begin from the Hansen-Jagannathan inequality which provides a lower bound

















where ch =l o gCh, and the second approximation holds assuming that the consumption growth of
the stockholders is log-normal. A large equity premium is then possible with a low risk aversion




percent quarterly, generating a quarterly Sharpe ratio of about 10 percent (and
√
4 × 0.10 ≈ 0.20
annually). In contrast, this volatility is 1.0 percent for the non-stockholders, and 2.1 percent in
a representative-agent model with the same parameterization as in the baseline economy. So, the
key to understanding the large equity premium is to understand the sources of the stockholders’
consumption growth volatility. And, hence, the main question is: why are the stockholders willing
to bear extra ﬂuctuations in their consumption in this environment?8
To this end, we use the budget constraint of a stockholder (and substitute the equilibrium
conditions, s0 =1 /µ,and bh = −B/µ) to write:




Similarly, X = W +
¡
B − PBB0¢
/(1 − µ). These expressions provide a useful decomposition:
variation in consumption growth may come from aggregate sources,s u c ha sﬂuctuations in wage
and dividend income (denote Ah ≡ W +D/µ), and from trade in the bond market (denote the net
debt payments of the stockholders as ah ≡
¡
B − PBB0¢
/µ.) The concentration of aggregate risk is
reﬂected in the scaling factor in D/µ, and the bond market channel is captured by ah.N o t i c ea l s o
that the volatility of stock prices plays no direct role in consumption volatility since in equilibrium
8The empirical evidence on stockholders’ consumption volatility is discussed in Section 7.
19Figure 2: The Evolution of the Wealth Distribution Over Time







































Stockholders (average wealth share = 0.87)
Non−stockholders
the stockholders always hold all shares outstanding. Using equation (7), it is easily shown that the


















w h e r ew eu s et h ea p p r o x i m a t i o nlog(1 + ah/Ah) ≈ ah/Ah, noting that this ratio is equal to 0.017
on average with a standard deviation of 0.045. The variance of consumption growth for the non-
stockholders can be obtained by replacing Ah and ah in equation (8) with An ≡ W,a n dan ≡
−ahµ/(1 − µ) respectively.
Table 7 displays the fraction of variability explained by each of the three terms in equation
(8). For the stockholders, only 22 percent of consumption growth variance is attributable to ﬂuc-
tuations in aggregate income (var
¡
∆logAh¢
), despite the fact that this component makes up
nearly all of their average consumption (row 1). Hence, the concentration of aggregate capital
income risk, included in Ah, contributes only modestly to consumption ﬂuctuations, and conse-
quently to the equity premium. The main source of volatility for the stockholders comes from
the bond market: debt payments made from the stockholders to the non-stockholders, ah, account
for the remaining three-quarters of variance (0.293 + 0.495) despite only making up less than 2
percent of average consumption. What is really crucial for this extra volatility is the timing of
trade: corr(∆logAh,∆ah)=−0.991, which means that the payments received by the the non-
stockholders increase exactly when aggregate income falls. This consumption smoothing for the
non-stockholders comes at the expense of large ﬂuctuations in the stockholders’ consumption, so
the covariance term in the third column accounts for half of the total volatility. The ﬂip side of this
story is seen in the variance of the non-stockholders: var(∆x) would be 3.3 times higher, were it
not for the consumption smoothing provided by the bond market.
Finally, since households continually adjust their asset holdings to smooth consumption ﬂuctu-
ations, it is of interest to ask if the amount of trade in the bond market, and the resulting shifts
20in the wealth distribution, are quantitatively plausible. First, ﬂuctuations in the amount of trade
in the bond market are quite modest: the standard deviation of the trade volume as a fraction
of average bond holdings, σ
¡
B − PBB0¢
/E(B), is 1.3 percent. (Using a slightly diﬀerent notion
of trade volume we have: σ(∆B)/E(B)=0 .4 percent). Second, Figure 2 plots the evolution of
the wealth distribution over time, which again shows rather gradual shifts in the wealth shares of
each group. These rather modest changes in aggregate bond holdings, B, entail large movements
in the stockholders’ consumption growth because the per-capita debt held by these households is
large: B/µ is about 6.2 times the stockholders’ quarterly consumption (and 1.6 times their annual
consumption).
5.2 Countercyclical Variation in Equity Premium
W eb e g i nw i t ha ni n t u i t i v ee x p l a n a t i o no ft h eb a s i c mechanism. A typical feature of precautionary
savings behavior is that agents accumulate wealth gradually in good times, but reduce it as quickly
as necessary to prevent a large fall in consumption during downturns.9 In the current model, since
the non-stockholders can only adjust their wealth through the bond market, this asymmetry in
behavior results in more trade in the risk-free asset during recessions. This can be seen in the









= −0.51. The discussion in the previous section
would then suggest that this increase in trade raises the consumption growth volatility of the
stockholders further in recessions, which in turn generates countercyclical variation in the moments
of asset prices.
It is useful to quantify the eﬀect of the described mechanism on the variation in the Sharpe
ratio. First, note that the Hansen-Jagannathan bound (6) holds approximately as an equality since
consumption growth is very highly correlated with excess returns, and this correlation changes very
little over time. So, the Sharpe ratio is approximately equal to αhσt
¡
∆ch¢
, and since αh is also
constant the only time variation can come from changes in the conditional volatility term. Not
surprisingly then, the Sharpe ratio increases by 46 percent from booms10 to busts, which is nearly
matched by a 44 percent increase in the stockholders’ consumption growth volatility between these
two states. (Table 8 reports the increase in the variance of consumption growth, which goes up
by (1 + 0.44)2 − 1 = 108 percent.) In contrast, the non-stockholders’ volatility increases only by 4
percent during busts.
It is convenient to decompose the stockholders’ consumption growth volatility as in equation 8,
but without using the approximation log(1+ah/Ah) ≈ ah/Ah, which is not accurate for the present
calculation. In the last three columns, each entry reports the percentage increase in var(∆ch) from
a boom to a bust that is due to the increase in the term at the top of the column (more precisely, the
second column for example reports: (100 × (varbust(∆logAh) − varboom(∆logAh))/varboom(∆ch),
9The main reason for this asymmetric behavior is that, with incomplete markets, the interest rate is below the time
preference rate, so accumulating precautionary wealth to smooth future consumption is costly in terms of foregone
current consumption.
10We deﬁne a boom (bust) as states when output is one standard deviation or more above (below) its mean.
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108.39 .24 9 .05 0 .2
A“ b o o m ”( b u s t )i sd e ﬁned as states when output is one standard deviation above (below) its mean.
For any statistic M, we use h ∆[M] to denote 100×(Mbust−Mboom)/varboom(∆c
h). With this deﬁn-




h) reported in column 1. In the last column, "cov" is the
covariance of the arguments in columns 2 and 3.
and others are deﬁned analogously.) It can easily be shown that the sum of the three entries
gives the total increase in consumption growth volatility reported in column 1. As can be seen in
Table 8, the change in aggregate volatility, var(∆logAh), explains only 9 percent of the increase in
variance of stockholders’ consumption growth. On the other hand, the increase in the volatility of
trade in the bond market during busts–captured by the terms in the last two columns–explains
a substantial fraction (99 percent out of the total 108 percent) of the rise in consumption volatility.
6 Habit versus Limited Participation: What is the Connection?
There are some interesting parallels between the asset pricing results of this paper and those
obtained by Campbell and Cochrane (1999).11 A natural question to ask then is whether these
similarities point to a deeper connection between the two frameworks. To address this question,

















⎦ =0 , (9)
where the stockholders’ consumption is written as CA− X. As mentioned in the Introduction, this
is the same Euler equation that would be implied by a representative-agent model with external
habit preferences, if X is reinterpreted as an exogenous habit stock. Now suppose that, due to
limited participation, asset prices are in fact determined by condition (9). In order to explain asset
prices in a representative-agent framework, one would need to subtract an amount equal to the
non-stockholders’ consumption (X) from the aggregate
¡
CA¢
every period to mimic the true Euler
equation. Thus omitting limited participation would make it look as if the representative-agent
was displaying habit persistence. Clearly, for this to be the case the properties of Xt must be very
similar in the two models.






t , which measures the fraction of consumption above
11In an earlier version of this paper (Guvenen (2002), available on the author’s website), we reported a broader set
of asset pricing results that are common to both models. We exclude those further results from the current version
to save space.
22the habit level–called the “surplus consumption ratio”–in the external habit model. In the current
framework the same ratio corresponds to the fraction of aggregate consumption accounted for by





















This alternative expression also holds in both frameworks, and can be viewed as adding an
extra state variable, St, to an otherwise standard Euler equation, which is known to have poor
asset pricing implications (as in Mehra and Prescott (1985)). Thus, for the success of either model
the properties of St is key. Stressing this central role CC introduce an AR(1) process for st ≡ log(St)
with a rich heteroskedastic shock structure:













, and choose the parameter value for φ and the functional form for λ(st) to
match certain features of asset prices.
To examine the connection between the two models, we compare the statistical properties of St
as well as the features of λ(st) a s s u m e di nC Cw i t ht h o s ei m p l i e db yo u rm o d e l .F i r s t ,w ee x a m i n e
the cyclical behavior of St in each framework. In the external habit model, the habit stock evolves
very slowly and lags behind actual consumption, making the surplus consumption ratio strongly
pro-cyclical. In our model St (now, the stockholders’ share of consumption) is also procyclical, with
a correlation of 0.92 with output. This correlation is primarily due to preference heterogeneity: the
stockholders have a higher EIS, so their consumption rises more than that of the non-stockholders
in response to a positive shock, increasing their consumption share in good times. For example, if
αh = αn =2 , the correlation of St with output becomes −0.59.
Second, we compare the densities of St displayed in Figure 3. The one in the left panel is obtained
by simulating the AR(1) process above (eq. 10) with the parameter choices in CC,12 and the one
in the right panel is the empirical density of
¡
Ch/CA¢
in our model. Considering how diﬀerently
the two ratios are generated, the densities appear quite similar to each other: both of them are
negatively skewed, with modes near the upper bound of their respective supports. However, one
diﬀerence between the two distributions is in their unconditional means: the average surplus ratio is
0.09 in CC (with variable interest rate), compared to 0.29 in the limited participation model. One
way to reduce St in the our model is by assuming a lower participation rate: for example, setting
µ =0 .10, implies an average value of 0.19 for St. Thus, one interpretation is that the external
habit model corresponds to the limited participation model where the number of stockholders, and
12Although the interest rate is constant in the baseline parameterization of CC, it is easy to extend their model (by
adding one more parameter) to allow for a variable interest rate (see page 214 of their paper for details). To make the
comparison of the two models meaningful, we calibrate this parameter to generate an annual interest rate volatility
of 5.6 percent to match the corresponding ﬁgure in our model. This extension modiﬁes some of the equations in the
external habit model including those that determine λ(st), and consequently, St.
23Figure 3: The Empirical Frequency Distribution of St In Each Model
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External Habit Model (Campbell−Cochrane 1999)
consequently their share in aggregate consumption, is small. (The results of the simulation with
µ =0 .10 are reported in the additional appendix.)
Third, the persistence parameter φ is calibrated in CC to match the autocorrelation structure
of the price-dividend ratio. Their parameter choice implies a quarterly persistence of 0.96 for St in




Fourth, the speciﬁcation of λ(st) is central to the external habit model. One key feature of λ is
that it is a decreasing function of st, which is responsible for the low volatility of interest rates and
the countercyclical variation in the price of risk in that model. To obtain the counterpart of λ in
our framework, we substitute the time-series of st and cA
t simulated from our baseline model into
equation (10), and back out the implied sensitivity function, which we call b λ(st). Notice that there
is nothing in our assumptions that mechanically relates the level or the slope of this function across
the two models. The left panel in ﬁgure 4 plots the sensitivity function from the CC model with a
constant interest rate (denoted λc)a n dav a r i a b l ei n t e r e s tr a t e( d e n o t e dλv) together with b λ (the
cloud of points) obtained from our baseline model. The function b λ is also downward sloping, but
is somewhat steeper than in the habit model. The average level of b λ is nearly the same as λv (but
lower than λc), implying from equation (10) that the response of the surplus ratio to a change in cA
t
is similar in the two models. In contrast, if preference heterogeneity is eliminated, the sensitivity
function implied by the limited participation model (the “circles” in the right panel) becomes close
to zero and displays no discernible pattern.
Finally, instead of the surplus ratio we can directly compare Xt in each model. In the external
habit model Xt evolves slowly, and in particular, it is much less volatile than aggregate consumption.
Similarly, non-stockholders’ consumption is very smooth compared to aggregate consumption in our
model: σ2 ¡
∆cA¢
/σ2 (∆x)=4 .3. Moreover, CC specify their model so that CA−X>0 everywhere
to make the power utility function well-deﬁned. This is also true in the current framework since
stockholders’ consumption (CA − X)i sa l w a y sp o s i t i v e .
24Figure 4: AC o m p a r i s o nO fλ(st) Across the Two Models
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Taken together, these comparisons show that the consumption process of the non-stockholders
in our model and the habit process in the external habit model share many similarities, which can
explain–through equation (9)–why asset prices display similar behavior in the two models.
One important diﬀerence between the two models, however, is in the risk aversion of the agents
w h op r i c et h es t o c k s . T os e et h i sp o i n t ,n o t et hat with external habit preferences, the RRA


















where ψt is the elasticity of consumption with respect to ﬁnancial wealth. With CC’s parameteriza-
tion α
St is approximately 40 at steady state and ψt is around 2, resulting in an average risk aversion
of 80. On the other hand, with limited participation, the Euler equation (9) only holds for the
stockholders, who consume Ch
t = CA
t − Xt, rather than CA
t . Consequently, taking all derivatives









ψt = αψt ≈ α
because ψt is around 1 in our framework. Thus in the baseline model RRAh
t ≈ α =2independent
of Xt.
7 Some Microeconomic Implications
7.1 Consumption Volatility
All existing studies that seek to explain the equity premium puzzle by appealing to limited partic-
ipation require stockholders’ consumption to be very volatile, and this paper is no exception. In
25Table 9: Volatility of Consumption Growth in the Limited Participation Model
αh =2 αh =4
QA QA
Stockholders 4.8 7.2 3.4 5.1
Non-stockholders 1.0 1.5 1.3 2.0
Notes: Q refers to quarterly, and A refers to annual statistics, all reported in percentages. Annual consumption
growth volatility is calculated by ﬁrst time-aggregating consumption over four consecutive periods, as is done
with actual data.
the baseline model the stockholders’ consumption growth volatility is 4.8 percent quarterly, and 7.2
percent annually. (Notice that the annual volatility is lower than 0.048×
√
4=0 .096 because time-
averaging over four consecutive quarters reduces variability in annual data). The corresponding
volatility ﬁgures for the non-stockholders are lower: 1.0 percent quarterly and 1.5 percent annually.
Thus the stockholders’ volatility is roughly 5 times higher than that of the non-stockholders.
Turning to empirical evidence, Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) report σ
¡
∆ch¢
/σ (∆x) ≈ 1.6, al-
though their consumption measure consists of only food expenditures from the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID). Attanasio, Banks and Tanner (2002) use expenditures on non-durables
and services from the U.K. Family Expenditure Survey and calculate stockholders’ volatility to be
1.5 to 2 times larger than non-stockholders’. (Moreover, unlike in Mankiw and Zeldes these volatil-
ities are adjusted to take account of the variance induced by sampling error and diﬀerences in cell
size, which is important since there are signiﬁcantly fewer stockholders than non-stockholders in
these samples.) While this evidence indicates that stockholders have more variable consumption
growth than non-stockholders, the diﬀerence is not as large as that implied by our model. In this
sense, the stockholders’ volatility in the baseline model is too high compared to the available data.
One possible way to bring the model closer to data is by assuming a higher risk aversion for the
stockholders (Table 9). With αh =4 , the stockholders’ annual volatility falls to 5.1 percent (and
the ratio of volatilities falls from 4.8 to 2.6). As noted earlier, the model’s asset pricing implications
are not negatively aﬀected by this change. Although this ﬁgure is probably still high compared
to the data, quantifying the size of the discrepancy is not very easy. The reason is that existing
measures of stockholders’ consumption (including those mentioned above) are based on micro data
sets that contain few “extremely rich” households. For example, Juster et al. (1999) report that the
richest one percent in the PSID data set have less than one-tenth of the wealth of the richest one
percent in the U.S., because rich households typically choose not to participate in these surveys.
B u ta tt h es a m et i m e ,t h er i c h e s to n ep e r c e n to w nn e a r l yhalf of all stocks, and the top 0.5 percent
own 37 percent of all stocks (Poterba and Samwick (1995)), and the lack of reliable information
on the consumption of these households makes a deﬁnitive empirical statement about stockholders’
consumption volatility diﬃcult.
To sum up, more work is needed to reconcile the model with the data along this key dimension.
It is of interest to see if the model could be extended to generate a consumption process for the
stockholders that is less volatile, while preserving its other time-series properties that delivers
26plausible asset pricing implications; or if alternative ways to measure the consumption of the very
rich would uncover a higher volatility for the stockholders in the data.
7.2 Quantifying the Participation Cost
We noted earlier that limited participation in the stock market could be supported as an endogenous
outcome with a ﬁxed participation cost of appropriate magnitude. Now we quantify the size of this
cost. We ﬁrst calculate the one-time ﬁxed cost, τF (Υ0),t h a ts o l v e s
V n ¡
ω0 − τF (Υ0);Υ0
¢
= V n∗ (ω0;Υ0),
where ω0 is the ﬁnancial wealth of the non-stockholder in aggregate state Υ0, and V n∗ is the value
function after entering the stock market. The maximum value of τF over the states (in the ergodic
set) measures the size of the ﬁxed cost needed to keep current non-stockholders out of the stock
market indeﬁnitely. This number is equal to 2.46 times a non-stockholders’ average annual income.
An alternative approach is to calculate the welfare gain from participation, expressed as the
fraction of consumption a non-stockholder would be willing to give up at every date and state to
become a stockholder. If the current aggregate state is Υ0, the proportional welfare gain, τP (Υ0),



















t is the agent’s consumption after entering the stock market. We assume that the agent’s
wealth at the time of entering the stock market is equal to the average wealth of a non-stockholder
in state Υ0. The maximum welfare gain (over all possible Υ0) is 5.2 percent of consumption per
year. Hence with a per-period ﬁxed cost equal to this amount, a non-stockholder would never enter
the stock market. Loosely speaking, the one time cost, τF, can be thought of as the present value
of the sequence of per-period ﬁxed costs, τP.
By either measure, these costs are clearly large, which shows that non-stockholders have a strong
incentive to enter the stock market.13 Although in this paper we do not explicitly address what
these costs of participation are, we believe that the results of this paper provide further motivation
for studying the sources of limited participation in future work.
13Note that comparing the average consumption or wealth of the existing stockholders to that of the non-
stockholders would be misleading. For example, a stockholder owns 27 times more wealth, and consumes 106 percent
more than a non-stockholder in the baseline model, which may seem to suggest signiﬁcantly higher welfare gains from
participating in the stock market. Of course these numbers do not account for the fact that non-stockholders have
diﬀerent preferences from stockholders, so when they enter the stock market they will choose not to accumulate a lot
of stock wealth, which would result in a very volatile consumption path. Also, the new entrants initially own very
little wealth and the transition period to the new steady state wealth level is very long–averaging about 120 years.
As a result the relatively high consumption levels realized in the distant future do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect welfare.
27Table 10: Wealth Distribution
The Fraction Held by the Top 20 percent of the Population:
Equity Financial Wealth Net Worth
U.S. data 98.2 92.3 83.8
Model 100.0 86.7 86.7
Notes: The equity data is from the 1992 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and is taken from Poterba and
Samwick (1995, Table 9). It includes indirect holding through mutual funds and direct contribution pension
funds, but excludes direct beneﬁt plans. The data on Financial Wealth and Net Worth is from the 1992 SCF
and is taken from Wolﬀ (2000, Table 2).
7.3 Wealth and Debt Distribution
We next turn to the implications of the model for the wealth distribution across the two groups
of households. We study the distribution of wealth (and consumption) implied by this model in a
separate paper (Guvenen (2003)) and provide a more extensive discussion of the issues summarized
here.
First, households in the top 20 percent of the wealth distribution are assumed to hold 100
percent of stocks in our model, and own 98 percent of all the equity in the U.S. data (see Table 10).
Second, the model generates substantial wealth inequality: 87 percent of total wealth is held by the
stockholders. Before comparing this ﬁgure to the data, notice that the model does not explicitly
include some important types of assets, such as housing, consumer durables, government debt,
and so on, nor does it distinguish between private and publicly traded capital. One approach is to
follow the real business cycle tradition and interpret the capital stock in the model more broadly, as
including these diﬀerent types of wealth categories (c.f., Cooley and Prescott (1995, page 17)). With
this approach the relevant measure of household wealth is comprehensive (net worth) and includes
all types of physical wealth. Column 3 reports that the stockholders own about 84 percent of the
net worth. On the other hand, it is fair to say that the non-stockholders in the model hold only a
riskless asset, whereas the broader deﬁnition of net worth includes categories–most notably housing
capital–that have risky returns. Alternatively then, if the model is interpreted more narrowly as
being about ﬁnancial asset portfolios, the empirical counterpart of wealth would be ﬁnancial assets
held by households. By this measure, 92 percent of wealth is held by the stockholders and only 8
percent is held by the non-stockholders. By either deﬁnition there is substantial wealth inequality
across these two groups in the U.S. data as in the baseline model.
Perhaps one surprising implication of the model is that the stockholders are net borrowers in
the bond market despite their substantial total wealth holdings. Given the level of abstraction
in the model, it seems more appropriate to interpret this borrowing more broadly as including
ﬁrm leverage and other types of indirect borrowing of the production sector from the rest of the
population. Masulis (1988, Table 1-3) reports that the average debt of U.S. ﬁrms (from 1929 to
1986) was 26 percent of ﬁrms’ market value, and 66 percent of ﬁrms’ book value. Saito (1995)
explicitly models ﬁrm leverage in a model with limited participation and shows that with this
reformulation the stockholders’ portfolio consists of levered equity together with positive bond
28Table 11: The Unconditional Moments of Returns: Various Parameterizations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Diﬀerence from Baseline: Baseline Hom. RRA Hom. RRA Government Storage ξ =0 .5
αh =4 Het. EIS Hom. EIS Debt technology
E(R
s−Rf)6 .11 5.98 2.78 6.16 3.24 3.70
σ(R
s−Rf)2 2 .42 2 .01 5 .32 2 .71 6 .21 6 .4
E(Rs−Rf)
σ(Rs−Rf) 0.27 0.26 0.18 0.27 0.20 0.23
E(R
f)0 .61 0.72 2.44 0.55 2.09 1.45
σ(R
f)7 .31 7.29 5.01 7.33 5.43 5.50
ρ(R
s,R f)0 .01 0.02 −0.03 −0.02 0.03 0.01
E(P
s/D)2 9 .42 9 .12 5 .93 2 .12 6 .53 0 .2
σ(log(P
s/D)) 30.52 9 .41 5 .95 0 .31 8 .53 3 .8









columns (4) and (5) the supply of the risk-free asset is set to 35 percent of average annual GDP. See the text for
more details.
holdings. Furthermore, in the next section we consider two extensions that allow for a positive
supply of debt. As we elaborate below, in one of these cases both groups hold positive amounts of
bonds, yet there is little change in the asset pricing results.
8 Extensions and Sensitivity Analyses
In this section we consider extensions of the baseline model and variations in the values of some
key parameters. As the benchmark, we take the baseline model with αh =4to start with a high
equity premium. This is important because if the premium falls too much in a speciﬁcation that
we consider below, borrowing constraints could become binding which would make comparison
across diﬀerent speciﬁcations diﬃcult. Except where indicated below, these modiﬁcations mainly
aﬀect the unconditional moments of returns with only minor consequences for the dynamics of
asset prices, which appear to be primarily driven by limited participation. To save space, we only
report the counterpart to Table 2 here. The counterparts of Tables 3 to 6 (the dynamics of asset
prices) for the parameterizations discussed in this section as well as additional sensitivity analyses
are included in an appendix available on the author’s website.
The Role of Preference Heterogeneity.–In our baseline model the stockholders and the non-
stockholders diﬀer both in their risk aversions and in their elasticities of intertemporal substitution.
We now solve the model with Epstein-Zin preferences and disentangle the two parameters. This
allows us to examine the role of each kind of heterogeneity for the results of the paper. First, we
e l i m i n a t et h eh e t e r o g e n e i t yi nr i s ka v e r s i o n( RRAh = RRAn =4 ), but keep the heterogeneity in
the elasticities: EISh =0 .25, EISn =0 .1. As reported in column 2, the eﬀect of this change on
the unconditional moments is very modest. Surprisingly, reducing the risk aversion of the non-
stockholders–who constitute 80 percent of the population–from 10 to 4 has very little impact
29on asset prices (including the dynamics of asset prices reported in the appendix). Second, we
also increase the EIS of the non-stockholders from 0.1 to 0.25, and thus eliminate heterogeneity
in preferences so that both agents have identical CRRA utility functions (speciﬁcally, RRAh =
RRAn =4 ,a n dEISh = EISn =0 .25). The equity premium now falls to 2.78 percent and the
volatility falls to 15.3 percent reducing the Sharpe ratio to 0.18 (column 3). The volatility of the
price-dividend ratio also falls by half. Thus, the EIS of the non-stockholders has a signiﬁcant
impact on the unconditional moments of returns. In addition, in this case the non-stockholders’
consumption becomes slightly more volatile than that of the stockholders (3.4 percent versus 3.3
percent per year), inconsistent with the empirical evidence discussed in Section 7. Furthermore
the stockholders’ consumption share (St) ceases to be procyclical (correlation with output: −0.26),
breaking the close link between this model and the external habit model. Overall, these results
show that the heterogeneity in the EIS is a key element in our model, while the heterogeneity in
risk aversion does not appear to play a signiﬁcant role.
Government Debt.–To investigate the eﬀect of a positive supply of the risk-free asset on our
results, we modify the bond market clearing condition: µbh +( 1− µ)bn = G > 0.W i t h t h i s





from the issuer of the bond. We consider two possible scenarios for the ﬁnancing of these payments.
First, we interpret this asset as government debt and assume that the government taxes labor income
at the required rate to make these interest payments every period. We set G equal to 35 percent
of average annual GDP, corresponding to the average government debt held by the U.S. public
during the period since 1962 (as reported on the Congressional Budget Oﬃce web site). Column
4 reports the results. There is little change in the unconditional moments (except for a big jump
in σ(log(P
s/D)) from 30.5 to 50.3 percent), and the dynamics of asset prices are also unaﬀected
(reported in the additional appendix).
T h er e a s o ni st h a tt h eﬁnancing of debt through taxation transmits the eﬀect of the non-
stockholders’ cyclical borrowing and lending pattern to stockholders. After a negative productivity
shock, the non-stockholders’ strong desire to reduce their bond holdings (for consumption smooth-
ing) increases the interest rate, which has two eﬀects: First, a higher interest rate increases the
tax rate necessary to ﬁnance debt payments, reducing each group’s labor income even further in
a recession. Second, the net interest payments received by bond owners increase, which primarily
beneﬁts the non-stockholders who own 95 percent of government bonds. As a result, the non-
stockholders experience both the cost and the beneﬁt of this higher interest rate which partly oﬀset
each other, whereas the stockholders only experience the cost (higher income volatility resulting
in higher consumption volatility). Thus, the general equilibrium mechanism described in Section
5, which ampliﬁes stockholders’ consumption volatility is still at play here, although indirectly
transmitted through the government budget constraint. Finally, unlike in the baseline model, the
stockholders’ average bond holdings is not negative in this case (≈ +0.05G), which suggests that
the distribution of debt per se is not critical for the asset pricing results presented.
Access to a Storage Technology.–One restrictive aspect of the previous exercise is that we
did not allow the government to smooth taxes by varying the bond supply (G). Modeling the
30government’s behavior is beyond the scope of this paper, so we consider the following (somewhat
extreme) case to break the link between interest rate and taxes: We assume that the risk-free asset
corresponds to a risk-free (tree) technology with ﬁxed capacity, G.14 In this case, (column 5) the
equity premium falls to 3.72, a forty percent fall compared to the baseline case. The volatilities
of returns are also lower though, so the Sharpe ratio falls by less, to 0.20. It seems reasonable to
conjecture that in the intermediate (and arguably more realistic) case–where the government is
allowed to change the supply of debt, but has to obey a transversality condition on its borrowing–
the eﬀect on asset prices would be somewhere between these two cases considered. Instead, if
the supply of safe technologies available to households for consumption smoothing is much larger
than what is assumed in these experiments, then clearly the eﬀect of limited participation could be
signiﬁcantly reduced.15
The Eﬀect of Adjustment Costs.–There is not a general consensus in the empirical literature
on the magnitude of the adjustment cost parameter, ξ,s oi ti su s e f u lt oe x a m i n et h eb e h a v i o ro f
the model as we vary this parameter. Increasing the elasticity of investment, ξ, to 0.5,l o w e r st h e
equity premium to 3.70, and its volatility to 16.4, resulting in a Sharpe ratio of 0.23.T h ee ﬀect on
asset price dynamics is minimal however (reported in appendix).
9 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we studied the asset pricing implications of a macroeconomic model with limited
stock market participation and heterogeneity in the EIS parameter. This particular two-agent
representation is parsimonious compared to traditional (fully) heterogenous-agent frameworks (e.g.,
Storesletten et al. (2001)), yet it generates a lot of heterogeneity across agents, which turns out
to be important for understanding asset prices. The model provides a new intuition for the equity
premium. The bulk of the premium results from the timing of trade in risk-free assets, which
accommodates the consumption smoothing demand by the population at large at the expense of
higher volatility in the consumption of stockholders.
The model generates a number of asset pricing phenomena and seems to capture some im-
portant aspects of asset price dynamics. Interestingly, many of these results are also generated
by the external habit model of Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and we show that this is not a
coincidence: the limited participation model has a reduced form which seems to be closely related
to the external habit model. In particular, the part of aggregate consumption accounted for by
the non-stockholders–necessarily omitted in a representative-agent framework–resurfaces as the
habit process in the external habit model.
14If we instead assume that the risk-free asset is in inﬁnite supply, this will eﬀectively shut down the bond mar-
ket and make limited participation irrelevant: in this case the non-stockholders’ saving will have no eﬀect on the
stockholders’ problem. So we do not consider this case.
15Another candidate for a storage technology is residential capital, which is the most common type of asset accu-
mulated by households outside of the top 20 percent. But the return on housing capital is hardly risk-free, and large
transaction costs in the housing market makes it poorly suited for insuring short-term ﬂuctuations in consumption
that is the focus of this paper.
31One important element missing from the current framework is growth. One diﬃculty with
introducing growth into an inﬁnite horizon model with heterogeneity in the EIS is that each agent’s
consumption growth will be proportional to her elasticity of substitution, implying that in the
long-run those with high EIS–the stockholders in our model–will end up accounting for all the
consumption (and own all the wealth) in the economy. Thus limited participation will have no eﬀect
in the long-run. One way to remedy this problem would be to assume an overlapping generations
structure and disallow negative bequests. In this case, households with low EIS in each cohort
cannot leverage the wealth of their future generations (to increase current consumption) as they
do in the inﬁnite horizon case. Hence, the life-time consumption of each cohort would be at least
equal to its life-time income, which grows together with the scale of the economy resulting in a
non-degenerate distribution of consumption that is needed to make limited participation matter
(through equation 9). Of course such an extension would introduce many issues that would have
to be resolved, and it is of interest to see how the results of this paper would be aﬀected by this
extension.
The assumption that the non-stockholders can only use a risk-free asset for consumption smooth-
ing is not as restrictive as it seems: by abstracting from (individual-level) idiosyncratic income
shocks and representing each group with a single agent, we are implicitly assuming the existence
of an array of ﬁnancial assets, which allows households within each group to vanquish all idio-
syncratic risk and attain perfect risk-sharing. Further, by abstracting from group-level shocks, we
are implicitly assuming that any shock that is negatively correlated across the two groups has also
already be eliminated. The remaining trade that takes place through the bond market arises from
the desire to smooth ﬂuctuations resulting from aggregate shocks, a motive whose strength diﬀers
across groups because of heterogeneity.
We hope that our results would also encourage further research on the reasons behind limited
participation which is not addressed in this paper. Furthermore, given the central role played
by limited participation in this model, another important research avenue is to investigate the
consequences of the recent trends in participation observed in most countries for asset prices as
well as for wealth inequality and welfare.
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